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ABSTRACT  
A corporate governance system has been designed to ensure efficient operations of 
companies on behalf of shareholders. Good practices of corporate governance 
principles and high protection of investors would attract foreign portfolio investment.  
This study aims to investigate the effect of corporate governance mechanisms (i.e. 
board size, board independence, audit committee size, audit committee independence 
and firm age) on foreign portfolio investment in Saudi listed firms for the year 2010. 
This study is significant due to the lack of empirical evidence regarding the field of 
corporate governance and foreign portfolio investment in Saudi firms since the Saudi 
code of corporate governance has been enacted in the late 2006. The results of the study 
show that board independence and audit committee independence are associated with 
foreign portfolio investment in Saudi listed firms. However, the corporate governance 
mechanisms, i.e. board size, audit committee size and firm age had no impact on 
foreign portfolio investment. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Background of the Study 
 
Corporate governance has been a common issue in recent years. It started in 1992 in 
the UK with the Cadbury Committee Report. This Report, on corporate governance, 
was the output of many high profile companies that were concerned, mainly, with 
weak protection of shareholders against the self-interests of managers and directors. 
In response to the corporate scandals, the US Congress approved the Sarbanes - Oxley 
Act on July, 2002; this Act aimed to enhance the practice of corporate governance and 
make it more transparent to shareholders and any users of financial reporting. In 
addition to this, and according to Organization for Economic 
Development  (Kimberly, 2002), foreign portfolio investments might also assist the 
home capital market by way of the creation of advanced implementations and 
methods to observe the portfolios. For example, financial reporting users and 
shareholders can utilize futures, options, swaps, hedging instruments, etc., to manage 
portfolio risk. This can be conducive to domestic markets, by improving risk 
management opportunities for all investors. Foreign portfolio investment can help 
strengthen and improve the functioning of domestic capital markets, hence bringing 
about better capital allocation and a healthier economy. Open markets also avail 
opportunities to foreign investors to diversify their portfolios, improve risk 
The contents of 
the thesis is for 
internal user 
only 
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